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IS THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES DOOMED?

THE "WAIT

AND SEE"

DocTRINE

Lewis M. Simes*
rules of the common law have shown such amazing vitality as
the rule against perpetuities. Emerging in the Duke of Norfolk's
Case1 in 1682, as a rule to restrict unbarrable entails in land, it is now
applied, not only to interests in land, legal and equitable, but also to
personal estate, tangible and intangible, including beneficial interests
in trusts. It is regarded as a part of the common law of nearly every
English speaking country, except a few of the United States where
statutory substitutes have been provided. Since 1930, statutory substitutes have been abolished and there has been a return to the common
law rule by legislative enactment in six states.2
In spite of this pronounced legislative trend, it is possible to detect
the stirrings of a counter current. The rule has recently been personified as "an elderly female clothed in the dress of a bygone period who
obtrudes her personality into current affairs with bursts of indecorous
energy," and who "must learn to sit by the fire and confine her activity
to a few words of wise advice from time to tirne." 3 Moreover, since the
decision in the case of Brown -v. Independent Baptist Church of
Woburn,4 in 1950, the distinction between executory devises and
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"" Floyd Russell Mechem University Professor of Law and Director of Legal Research,
University of Michigan.-Ed.
l 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 22 Eng. Rep. 931.
2Afa. Gen. Acts (1931) No. 684; Cal. Stat. (1951) c. 1463; 114 Ohio Laws (1931)
p. 470; Indiana Laws (1945) c. 216; Mich. Public Acts (1949) No. 38; Wyoming Laws
(1949) c. 92.
s Leach, "Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror," 65 HARv.
L. REv. 721 at 725 and 727 (1952).
4 325 Mass. 645, 91 N.E. (2d) 922. This case involved a devise of land to a church
"to be holden and enjoyed by them so long as they shall continue as a church;" and if the
church be dissolved then the land was to go to certain named persons. A later clause in
the will devised the residue of the estate to the same named persons. The court determined
that the first devise to the named persons was an executory interest, void under the rule
against perpetuities; but this left a possibility of reverter in the testatrix's estate, which was
validly devised by the residuary clause. Of course, under orthodox doctrines, the residuary
clause created a void executory interest as well as the prior gift over. For it was created
by the same instrument by which the determinable fee was created. The testatrix did not
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possibilities of reverter would seem to have become so completely obliterated in .Massachusetts as to permit the exact equivalent of a legal
executory interest to be created in any living person who might be
selected, without being subjected to the restrictive operation of the rule
against perpetuities.

I
THE 'WAIT

AND SEE"

DocTRINB

The most serious aspect of this counter trend, however, remains to
be described. To use the apt phrase of its chief proponent, it is the
"wait and see" doctrine. It means that the validity of contingent future
interests under the rule against perpetuities is to be determined as of
the time when the contingency occurs.
Before entering upon a discussion of that doctrine, a brief statement
of the existing common law rule5 on this matter should be made. First,
let us recall Gray's shorthand statement of the rule, which is as follows:
"No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twentyone years after some life in being at the creation of the interest." 6 In
applying this rule, the validity of a future interest is, with one exception, determined by considering the facts as they exist at the time the
period of the rule begins to run, this time commonly being the delivery
of the deed or the death of the testator. The one exception arises when
an appointment under a general power to appoint by will only, or under
a special power, is involved. In those cases, though the period is
counted from the creation of the power, the validity of the appointment
is determined by a consideration of facts as they exist at the time when
the power is exercised. 7
:first create a determinable fee and then devise it, for she did not die twice. See 2 PnoP·
ERTY RESTATEMENT §§154 and 158 (1936). Since, unfortunately, the possibility of
reverter is not subject to the rule against perpetuities, this decision permits a testator, by
placing a gift in the residuary clause, to make_ it a possibility of reverter and thus exempt
it from the rule against perpetuities.
It is true, in any jurisdiction in which possibilities of reverter are alienable, a person
can create a determinable fee by one conveyance and assign the possibility of reverter, which
he thereby reserves to himself, in a later conveyance. That is because one can make two
conveyances, taking effect at different times, and he, therefore, can first create a possibility
of reverter and later assign it. This is bad enough, but the recent Massachusetts decision
extends the evil to testamentary transactions.
5 By the existing common law rule is meant the rule in jurisdictions other than Massachusetts and New Hampshire. The law of these states is later discussed.
6 GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 4th ed., 191 (1942).
7 See, for example, Warren's Estate, 320 Pa. 112, 182 A. 396 (1936).
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A. Sources of the Doctrine
Early in 1952, Professor W. Barton Leach, of the Harvard Law
School, published two substantially identical articles, one in the Harvard Law Review8 and one in the Law Quarterly Review,° in which
he advocated legislation modifying the common law rule against perpetuities so that the validity of a contingent interest would be determined in the light of events existing when the contingency occurred.
''Whatever reason may be adduced through either ancient authority
or present contrivance," he says, "I am certain that the better reason
is opposed to the current doctrine. By hypothesis the interests in question are all contingent.... Why should we not 'wait and see' to determine whether the contingency happens within the period of the
Rule?"10
Later in 1952, when the American Law of Property came off the
press, similar views were expressed in Part XXIV, written by Professor
Leach and Mr. Owen Tudor, of the Boston bar. These views are
indicated by the following excerpt: 11 "The reason, if any, for the rule
that, in case of a devise or bequest, the courts will not 'wait and see'
whether events actually turn out in such a way as to cause all interests
to vest within the period of perpetuities is this: As soon as an interest
is created its validity should be capable of ascertainment. The present
writers do not consider this an adequate reason-by hypothesis the
remainder is contingent, so all the parties must 'wait and see' which way
the contingencies happen; why is there any inconvenience in requiring
them to 'wait and see' whether the contingencies happen within the
period of the Rule?"
A few months after the publication of the American Law of Property, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts handed down its
decision in the case of Sears v. Coolidge. 12 The facts were substantially as follows: The settlor of an inter vivos trust had reserved to
himself a power to amend and declare new uses in any manner except
8 "Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror," 65 HAnv. L.
fuv. 721 (1952).
9 "Perpetuities: Staying the Slaughter of the Innocents," 68 L.Q. fuv. 35 (1952).
10 65 HAnv. L. fuv. 721 at 730 (1952). Similar language appears in 68 L.Q. fuv.
35 at 44 (1952). In each article legislative changes in the rule are suggested for consideration, the fust of which is "a provision that the rule will be applied to any interest on
the basis of events which have actually occurred at the termination of the preceding
interests, not on the basis of events which might have occurred but did not." 65 HARV. L.
fuv. 721 at 747 (1952).
116 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY 102 (1952). While the passage quoted purports
to state the view of "the writers," note 7, page 102, and note 4a, page 104, indicate that
Mr. Tudor does not entirely agree with Professor Leach's "wait and see" doctrine.
12 108 N.E. (2d) 563 (1952).
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for his own benefit. This power is treated, for purposes of the case, as
a special power of appointment. Subject to the power, and qualified
by an alternative contingency which did not occur, the corpus of the
trust was to be distributed to the settlor's issue living at the time of
distribution, which was fixed at the time when the settlor's youngest
grandchild living at his death should attain the age of fifty. The youngest grandchild who attained the age of fifty was in being when the
trust was created, and no grandchildren were born after the trust was
set up. The power was not exercised. The court held that the provision for distribution was valid under the rule against perpetuities. Citing the American Law of Property,1 3 from which quotation has herein
been made, the court reasoned that, since the facts existing when a
special power of appointment is exercised may be considered in determining the validity of the appointment, it should also be possible, in
determining the validity of a gift in default, to consider facts existing
when the donee dies and the power is unexercised.
This, of course, is a long way from accepting the "wait and see"
doctrine in its entirety, and would seem merely to extend the doctrine
to a gift in default of appointment. Moreover, the case could have
been decided on a perfectly orthodox ground which the court referred
to but did not rely on. At the time the trust was created, the settlor was
eighty-one years old and a widower. His only children then living
were two daughters, one aged fifty-nine years and the other fifty-five
years. It could fairly, therefore, be assumed that, when the settlor
referred to "the attainment of fifty by the youngest surviving grandchild
of mine who was living at my death," he meant "youngest grandchild
of those living when the trust was set up," because he did not anticipate
that he would have any more grandchildren.14
In Merchants Nat. Bank v. Curtis,1 5 the New Hampshire Supreme
Court passed upon the validity of a gift over in a testamentary trust
limited to vest "if my granddaughter M.M.C. or other grandchildren
shall survive both my children and shall have and leave no heirs of her
or their body." M.M.C. was the only granddaughter which the testatrix had. She died without leaving any surviving issue. The court
held the gift over valid under the rule. First, the court gave the perfectly orthodox reason that there were really two alternative contingencies, namely, the death of M.M.C. without surviving issue, and the
13 The court cited 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §24.36 (1952), which is concerned
with the single question whether, in determining the validity of a gift in default, facts
existing when the donee died may be considered.
14 4 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT §377, comment c (1944).
15 97 A. (2d) 207 (1953).
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death of unborn grandchildren without surviving issue. The first was
clearly valid in its inception under the rule, since M.M.C. was the life
in being. Since this is the contingency which occurred, the gift over
was good.16 But the court went on to say that the 'condition might be
construed as a single contingency, in which case the facts could be
considered as of the time when the testatrix's children died. The
American Law of Property and Professor Leach's Harvard Law Review
article, which have already been referred to, were cited with approval,
the court observing: "When a decision is made at a time when the
events have happened, the court should not be compelled to consider
only what might have been and completely ignore what was."
In addition to these two cases we have one statute which definitely
lays down the "wait and see" doctrine. In 1947, as a part of its new
Estates Act, the Pennsylvania legislature enacted the following provision:17
"Upon the expiration of the period allowed by the common
law rule against perpetuities as measured by actual rather than
possible events, any interest not then vested and any interest in
members of a class the membership of which is then subject to
increase shall be void."
Apparently it was not realized how revolutionary this piece of legislation is. The comment in the report of the Joint State Government
Commission, in which the statute is presented to the legislature, states,
"This subsection is intended to disturb the common law rule as little
as possible...."18 A justification for the new provision is that, according to Pennsylvania law, it appears that the courts will not construe
a will for the purpose of determining the validity of contingent equitable interests in a trust until after the death of the life tenant.19 To
date the Pennsylvania courts have not construed this statute.
Thus we have in support of the existence of a "wait and see" doctrine two cases, each of which could be decided on other and perfectly
orthodox grounds, and an uninterpreted statute.19 a Evidently we cannot
16 4 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT §376 (1944).
17 1 Pennsylvania Laws (1947) No. 39, §4(b).
18 Report of the Joint State Government Commission of the General Assembly of
Pennsylvania Relating to the Following Decedents' Estates Laws: Intestate Act of 1947;
Wills Act of 1947; Estates Act of 1947; Principal and Income Act of 1947, p. 72 (1947).
19 See Quigley's Estate, 329 Pa. 281, 198 A. 85 (1938), cited to this effect in the
Report referred to in note 18 supra. In general on declaratory judgments in Pennsylvania,
see the monograph on that subject by Professor Levin, published in Purdon's Pennsylvania
Statutes Annotated (1953), immediately preceding title 12, §731. Of course, what the
Pennsylvania legislature did was to perpetuate a bad rule as to the time when the validity
of a future interest can be determined.
19a See Addendum, infra p. 194.-Ed.
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be sure that the doctrine is iJ force anywhere except in Pennsylvania,
and we still do not know precisely what it means there. But before this
innovation spreads further, it may be well to consider what it means
and where it is likely to lead us.

B. The Case against the 'Wait and See" Doctrine
It is my belief that the "wait and see" doctrine, in the unqualified
form presented in the Pennsylvania statute and elsewhere,2° is undesirable and unworkable; and that its adoption means that the rule
against perpetuities is doomed.
I. Since a contingent future interest exists when the creating
instrument takes effect, its validity should be determined as of that time.
Protagonists of the "wait and see" doctrine appear to find something
startling about determining the validity of an interest in accordance
with facts existing when it is created. It would seem that to consider
validity as of the time when interests arise is a completely normal process which runs all through our legal system. The validity of a devise
on a condition in restraint of marriage is not determined when the
devisee marries. Suppose, for example, a testator devises his estate to
his two-year-old daughter on a condition subsequent that she never
marry. We do not wait until she is old enough to be legally capable of
marriage before determining whether the condition is illegal. We
det<;rmine it at the death of the testator. Contracts are determined to
be against public policy when they are executed, not when one of the
parties does something against public policy.
A good deal has been said, both in prose and poetry, about the
validity of limitations under the rule against perpetuities being determined on the basis of what "might have been." It is submitted that all
20 For comments on the Pennsylvania statute, see the following: Bregy, "A Defense of
Pennsylvania's Statutes on Perpetuities," 23 TEMPLE L.Q. 313 (1950); Phipps, "The
Pennsylvania fu"Periment in Perpetuities," 23 TEMPLE L.Q. 20 (1949); notes, 60 HARv.
L. REv. 1174 (1947); 23 N.Y. Umv. L.Q. 511 (1948); 97 Umv. PA. L. REv. 263
(1948); 26 TEMPLE L.Q, 148 (1952).
In general, on the "wait and see" doctrine, in addition to the Leach articles cited,
notes 8 and 9 supra, see the following: 6 AMErucAN LAw OF PROPERTY 40, 99-106
(1952); Newhall, "Doctrine of the 'Second Look'," 92 TRUSTS AND EsTATES 13 (1953);
"Reform of the-Rule Against Perpetuities,'' Panel Discussion by Looker, Leach, Simes and
Newhall, 92 TRUSTS AND EsTATES 768 (1953), same in A.B.A. PROCEEDINGS, PROBATE
AND TRUST LAw DIVISIONS 83 (1953).
It should be pointed out that, in the panel discussion last cited, Professor Leach merely
advocated determining the facts as they exist at the termination of the life estate in applying the rule against perpetuities. Since, however, he did not indicate any retraction from
the position taken in earlier writings, it is to be assumed that his proposal made at the
A.B.A. meeting represented what he believed a legislature might be willing to enact.
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the rule against perpetuities does is to look at facts as they are when
the testator dies or when the deed is delivered. In a number of jurisdictions interested parties may be able to have the validity of future
interests determined immediately upon the inception of the instrument.21 Ideally, in such jurisdictions, the suit to determine the validity
of the future interest would be brought at the moment of the inception
of the interest. If that were true, then the decision would never be
made on the basis of facts which "might have been." But since in
practice there will be a period of time between the inception of the
instrument and the filing of the suit, it sometimes could happen that
there would be a decision on the basis of facts which had not and could
not occur. However, no one, whether he favors the "wait and see"
doctrine or not, would contend that the facts should be determined as
of the time suit is filed, since that would give the plaintiff an opportunity, by careful timing, to determine the validity of the future
interest.
It is true, in some jurisdictions, when a trust involves an equitable
life estate with future interests following it, the courts refuse to determine the validity of the future interests until the life estate ends. But
that rule has nothing to do with the rule against perpetuities and is
inconsistent with the modem trend of enlightened jurisprudence. Certainly the existence of a bad rule such as that should not cause us to
change the rule against perpetuities.
There was a time when a person in whose favor a contingent
future interest was limited was thought of as having little more than
a bare expectance like the spes successionis of the heir apparent. He
had no remedies to protect his interest before it vested; he could not
assign it; for practical purposes it did not exist until it vested. But
today, if modem trends in the law of future interests mean anything,
they mean that future interests are existing interests and can be owned
just as certainly as possessory fees simple in land.22
The practical effect of the "wait and see" doctrine in this respect
may be illustrated by the following case. A transfers securities to T
on trust to pay the income to B for his life, and to hold until B has a
son who has attained the age of fifty years, and then to transfer the
corpus to such son; in default of any such son, then to transfer the
corpus to C. Bis alive and has a son, D, twenty-one years of age, who
is in excellent health. T, the trustee, is attempting to embezzle the trust
21 See 2 ANDERSON, DECLARATORY JunG:MENTs,

2d ed., §576 (1951).
2 PROPERTY REsTAT!ll\1llNT §153 (1936), where a future interest is described
as a "segment of ownership."
22 See
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estate in collusion with B. Under existing legal doctrines, the limitations both to the son of B and to C are void under the rule against
perpetuities. There would be a resulting trust in favor of A, who
would be able to proceed against the trustee. But suppose we apply
the "wait and see" doctrine. It would seem that neither C nor D could
proceed against T.23 For when each brings his suit, the court will say:
We cannot do anything for you, for your interest may be void ab initio
under the rule against perpetuities; we must "wait and see." Nor is it
clear that A can sue on any theory of resulting trust. For at the present
time, D's interest may be valid, or C's interest may be valid. While
technically it is possible to say that there is a resulting trust even if that
be true, the interest of A would be so slight and ephemeral that equity
might well refuse any remedy.
If a contingent future interest exists for any purpose at the inception of the creating instrument, its validity should be determined as of
that time. The reason why we consider the validity of an appointment
in the light of facts existing when it is made is that the future interest
is then created.24 But to say that the validity of a future interest,
involving a right to present protection and a present power to alienate,
cannot now be determined, involves both a logical and a practical
anomaly.

2. This doctrine leaves us without any satisfactory method of
determining who are the lives in being.25 How do we determine the
lives in being under the existing rule? The answer is, we may use any
life as the measure, provided we can say, at the time the instrument
takes effect, that, no matter what happens, the contingent interest will
not vest later than twenty-one years after the termination of that life.
As Professor Leach has said: "The measuring lives need not be mentioned in the instrument, need not be holders of previous estates and
need not be connected in any way ·with the property or the persons
designated to take it."26
23 It may be argued that it is better to deny an action to C and D than to hold their
interests void, as would be done under the common law rule. In answer it may be said
that it is better to give a resulting interest to the settlor than to allow the trustee to
embezzle the fund.
24 It might also be said that the gift in default is not effectually created until it is
certain that the power will not be exercised and that the non--exercise of the power is a kind
of appointment to the taker in default. This would justify the result in Sears v. Coolidge,
(Mass. 1952) 108 N.E. (2d) 563.
25 This argument applies only if the facts are considered as of the time when the
future interest vests. If any point of time prior to the happening of the contingency, such
as the termination of a present life estate, or the exercise of a special power of appointment
is selected, there is no difficulty in determining who are the lives in being.
26 Leach, "Perpetuities in a Nutshell," 51 HARv. L. REv. 638 at 641 (1938).
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Suppose a testator devises his estate on trust to distribute to such of
his lineal descendants as are alive twenty-two years after his death. If
we look at this as of the testator's death, there is no life in being that
can be used as the measure and the interest is void. For no matter
whom we select, it is possible that the person may die within less than
a year after the testator's death. On the other hand, if we apply the
"wait and see" doctrine, we can use the life of any person who was
alive at the testator's death and who lived for at least one year thereafter. The fact that there will likely be millions of people who come
within that description should not invalidate the provisions. It is true,
there is a rule to the effect that the measuring lives must not be so
numerous that evidence of their deaths is likely to be unreasonably
difficult to obtain.27 But that refers to cases where the interest is to
vest on the death of the last survivor of several persons, such as a
bequest to the last survivor of all persons whose names appear in the
New York City telephone directory. In the case of a bequest to vest
twenty-two years after the testator's death, we need £.nd only one life
under the "wait and see" doctrine, and that will probably be quite easy.
Perhaps it may be queried: Then why is not the "wait and see"
doctrine desirable for that very reason? My answer is, if you can apply
it in that case you can also apply it in a case where there is a devise
to such of the testator's lineal descendants as are alive 120 years after
the testator's death. If a person can be found who was alive when the
testator died and who lived more than ninety-nine years after the time
of the testator's death, the limitation would be good. One can imagine,
in such a case, remote lineal descendants patiently awaiting the termination of the 120 year period, not knowing after all this time whether
the limitation is good or bad. And £.nally, at the end of the 120th year,
the attorney for the descendants advertises for evidence concerning
any person who died twenty years ago and who was at least one hundred years old at the time of his death. Doubtless the attorney will
eventually £.nd such a person. For in every year there must be at least
a few persons who die at the age of one hundred. But what a fantastic
way to determine the_ validity of a future interest!
A still more difficult case to solve, if the "wait and see" doctrine
is to be applied, is the following: A devises Blackacre "to the B Church
in fee simple; but if the land should ever cease to be used for church
purposes, then to C in fee simple." How long do we wait to see
whether that contingent future interest violates the rule against per27 4 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT

§374 and comment l to that section (1944).
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petuities? Do we wait 120 years? or 130 years? Or must the church
·actually cease to do business before we can decide whether the executory interest is void?
3. The "wait and see" doctrine is a long step in the direction of
inalienability of property. First, it seems clear, from the discussion
which has preceded, that if the lives are selected at the end rather than
at the beginning, longer lives will likely be chosen. The draftsman
who selects twelve healthy babies at the inception of the future interest
for the measuring lives may find that they all die within six months.
But if he could select the lives when the contingency happens, he
could never fail to find long ones. On this matter, hindsight is inevitably better than foresight.
Moreover, the fact that the future interest is not determined to be
either good or bad until the contingency happens means that in many
instances property would be inalienable for quite a long time in cases
where, by the application of the common law rule, it would not be rendered inalienable even for a day. This objection is particularly serious
in cases involving legal titles to land. While, of course, the vast majority of future interests about which litigation arises are equitable interests in trusts, an examination of the reports shows that problems involving contingent legal interests in land are not negligible.
It may also be pointed out that the proponents of the "wait and
see" doctrine appear to be thinking solely in terms of problems involved
in family trusts, and not from the standpoint of a land title attorney. I
venture to assert that, if the "wait and see" doctrine were presented to
any of the leading land title organizations of this country, its repudiation would be practically unanimous.
Consider again the fact situation already referred to. A devises
Blackacre "to the B Church in fee simple; but if the land should ever
cease to be used for church purposes, then to C in fee simple." At
common law the executory interest limited to C is void, and B church
at once has a fee simple absolute. According to the "wait and see"
doctrine, we would have to wait until the condition happens before
knowing whether the title of the church is good. Suppose after 125
years, the church ceases to function, and after diligent search, no measuring life can be found. Then the court decides that the church had
a good title all the time. We have thus tied up the title for 125 years
where it would not have been tied up at all at common law; and we
have done so without carrying out the testator's wishes one whit more
than the common law.
Not only does the "wait and see" doctrine increase inalienability
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by postponing a decision when future interests are involved; it can also
postpone a decision when present interests are involved. There is a
doctrine which has aptly been termed the doctrine of infectious invalidity. 28 It is to the effect that, even though an interest devised may
be perfectly valid in itself, if it is so closely connected with a future
interest which fails under the rule against perpetuities that the testator
would have preferred to die intestate rather than to have the future
interest alone held invalid, then the present as well as the future interest
fails.
Suppose a testator has an estate of $300,000 and has three principal
objects of his bounty, his children A, Band C, who are his only heirs.
He bequeaths $100,000 to A. He bequeaths $100,000 to a trustee
on trust to pay the income to B for life, and to transfer the corpus after
his death to such of his children as attain the age of thirty years. He,
also, makes the same sort of bequest of $100,000 on trust to pay the
income to C for his life, and to transfer the corpus after his death to
such of his children as attain the age of thirty years. Under the cominon
law rule, the remainder interests limited to B's children and to C's
children would be void. It is entirely possible, also, under the doctrine
of infectious invalidity, a court might hold the life estates in B and C
and the bequest to A void. 29 This is because the testator intended a
substantially equal distribution among his children, and this would be
more nearly secured by holding that he died intestate as to all his estate.
Under the "wait and see" doctrine, however, no question of invalidity
could be determined until B and C die. Thus we would be in the
absurd position of saying that the validity of the life estates could not
be determined until the life estates had expired, and that the validity
of the present absolute bequest of $100,000 could not be determined
until the same time.
I realize that it may be argued that in none of the cases I have put
is the property tied up more than lives in being and twenty-one years
under the "wait and see" doctrine, and that the present law permits a
tying up for that period of time. But, there is no principle in the law
that it is good public policy to tie up property for lives in being and
twenty-one years. It is not good public policy to tie up property even
for a day. But it is good public policy to allow people to do what they
wish with their own property. The law strikes a rough balance be2 8 6 AMEmcAN LAw OF PROPERTY §§24.48
MllNT §402 (1944).
29 See In re Richards' Estate, 283 Mich. 485,

to 24.52 (1952); 4

PROPERTY RllsTATE-

278 N.W. 657 (1938); Millikin National
Bank of Decatur v. Wilson, 343 lli. 55, 174 N.E. 857 (1931).
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tween these two conflicting policies, and the rule against perpetuities
is the result. By the "wait and see" doctrine the balance is pushed
farther in the direction of inalienability. Moreover, to tie up property
for the period of the rule, and then eventually to prohibit a testator
from doing what he wishes with his own property after all, would seem
to be backed by no public policy whatsoever.

C.

Conclusions

If the "wait and see" doctrine is generally adopted, in my opinion
the common law rule against perpetuities, in anything like the form in
which we know it, will cease to exist. If the doctrine is accepted in an
unqulified form, the rule will have little restrictive effect. Property
will be tied up more frequently and for longer periods.
.
On the other hand, if the doctrine is adopted at all, I think it more
likely that its operation will be restricted and a new method of determining lives in being will slowly be evolved. Thus, an attempt may
be made to limit the lives in being to those named or implied in the
creating instrument. That, however, would seem to be a vague and
unsatisfactory solution. As Lord Chief Baron Macdonald said in
Thellusson v. Woodford, 30 the first great case in which it was determined that the lives in being need not be persons who take under the
creating instrument, "The length of time will not be greater or less ...
whether the lives are those of persons immediately connected with, or
immediately leading to that person in whom the property is first to vest:
terms to which it is difficult to annex any precise meaning." (Italics
are the author's.) If the courts do work out a new method of ascertaining the lives in being, it may mean years of uncertainty and costly
litigation; and when the law is settled, it will not be the rule against
perpetuities.

II
PUBLIC POLICY BACK OF THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES

31

Doubtless there are those who feel that, even if my dire predictions
prove true and the rule against perpetuities vanishes, it will be no great
loss. It can be contended that the policy of the rule is to prevent inalienability of specific property, and that this policy js rarely violated by
future interests which are created today. For most future interests are
11 Ves. 112 at 137, 32 Eng. Rep. 1030 at 1040 (1805).
a discussion of the rationale of the rule against perpetuities, see 4
RBsTATBMBNT 2129 (1944).
30
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equitable interests in trusts, and the trustee has a power to alienate the
subject matter of the trust. Or if the contingent interest in question is
a legal interest in a specific thing, ·such legislation as the Pennsylvania
Price Act3 2 permits a sale of an absolute interest in property and the
establishment of a trust in the proceeds. As one proponent of the "wait
and see" doctrine has put it, "In a sense, the period of the rule as it was
originally understood has been shortened to zero."33
It is true, the rule against perpetuities was developed primarily to
further the alienability of specific land. The early English cases dealing
with the rule practically all involve contingent legal interests in particular pieces of real estate. There can be little doubt that sound public
policy is violated by rendering specific tangible things inalienable. It
means that property is less productive, and the national income decreases. The possessory owner may not wish to make a specific piece
of property productive because he lacks the capacity for that sort of
thing, or because he has nothing to invest in its development. Or it may
be that the existence of a remote future interest means that the possessory owner does not wish to•invest in the development of the property
because his ownership may terminate on an uncertain event. But he
cannot sell it to a person who is willing and able to make the property
productive, because the existence of the future interest makes it unmarketable.
If, however, an equitable interest in a trust is involved, the trustee
is almost certain to have a power to invest and reinvest. Indeed it is his
duty to make the trust property productive. Hence, the existence of
remote future interests in trusts does not, as a rule, make property less
productive or reduce national income. It is believed, however, that
there are other grounds for restricting the tying up of property in a fund.
First, it is good public policy to allow each person to dispose of
his property as he pleases. This policy extends not only to the present
generation but to future generations. If we are to permit the present
generation to tie up all existing capital for an indefinitely long period
of time, then future generations will have nothing to dispose of by
will except what they have saved from their own income; and the
property which each generation enjoys will already have been disposed
of by ancestors long dead. The rule against perpetuities would appear
to strike a balance between the unlimited disposition of property by
32 See Pa. Stat. Ann. (Cum. Supp. 1952) tit. 20, §1561.
33 Bregy, "A Defense of Pennsylvania's Statute on Perpetuities,"

23 Tl!:MPLE L.Q.
313 at 323 (1950). Mr. Bregy, however, does not contend that there should be no restriction today on the beneficial interests in private trusts. See his note 21 on the page above
cited.
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the members of the present generation and its unlimited disposition
by members of future generations.
Second, by prohibiting too remote future interests in trusts, economic stagnation is avoided. When we say that a trustee has power
to invest and reinvest, we do not mean that he can do anything he
likes with the trust fund. Indeed, his power to dispose of it is extremely
limited. He cannot give it away; he cannot invest it in new and
untried enterprises. He· cannot make a speculative investment in
unimproved real estate. As a trustee, he is pretty much limited to
investing in :6.rst mortgages and in seasoned stocks and bonds. Yet if
society is to advance, somebody must take risks by putting capital in
new enterprises. Somebody must invest in the development of industrial uses of atomic energy. Somebody must put capital into jet propelled transportation. If all the world's savings are tied up in trusts
which restrict the use of funds to the conservative pattern set by a
by-gone era, who will :finance the Columbus of a new industrial age?
Furthermore, to meet the changing and unforeseeable economic conditions of each generation, there should be some free How of property
between capital investments and consumers' goods. If all accumulated
capital is frozen in perpetual private trusts, the demands of any given
moment cannot release it for consumption. If depression strikes, so
that beneficiaries of trusts need to invade corpus, or if inflation becomes
rampant, so that the amount of trust income determined by a dead
hand becomes inadequate, the beneficiary cannot use the capital of the
trust.
Other policies back of the rule, which are applicable to future
ip.terests in a fund, have been suggested. It is said that the rule
prevents undue concentration of wealth. On the other hand, it has
been suggested that, if there is any law of survival of the economic
:fittest, a restriction on the tying up of trust property is necessary to
make it work.
Judicial opinion has always favored the application of the rule
against perpetuities to beneficial interests in trusts. Indeed, it never
seems to have been doubted that a power in a trustee to invest and
reinvest does not take the beneficial interests of the trust out of the
rule. 34 Even when statutes prohibiting the suspension of the absolute
power of alienation - are involved, the same conclusion has been
reached,35 though a literal interpretation of such statutes might lead
to the opposite conclusion.
See 4 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT §370, comment p (1944).
some states, statutes were enacted expressly providing that the power of a trustee
to change the form of the subject matter did not prevent the illegal suspension of the power
34

35 In
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III
WHAT

SHOULD

BE DoNE AsouT

IT?

It must be conceded that much of the discussion so far has been
negative. While I do not approve of the "wait and see' doctrine, I
recognize that the evils which Professor Leach has so dramatically
portrayed in his article do exist. Just what should be done about them,
I am not sure.
It may be desirable to proceed with legislation of a very specific
character, to take care of each particular situation which has perennially
caused trouble---the "unborn widow" case, the "fertile octogenerian"
case, the administrative contingency. I also approve of Professor
Leach's suggestion that we provide for a cy pres doctrine, applicable
to private trusts, which will permit the court to remold them when
future interests are invalid under the rule.
If these reforms are thought to be insufficient, and it is felt that
the common law rule against perpetuities is too deeply encrusted with
the ashes of a dead feudalism, then I suggest that a new restrictive
rule be considered with an entirely new approach. What I have to
say in this regard should in no sense be treated as a proposed solution.
More study of all its implications should be made before it can be
determined whether it is a feasible substitute for the rule. I am merely
suggesting that its possibilities should be investigated before we decide
to adopt the "wait and see" doctrine.
The real difficulty which the rule against perpetuities seeks to
eliminate is the inalienability of present interests, not future interests.
Vested as well as contingent interests may tie up property. The only
present interests which are freely marketable are absolute interests in
land, chattels and intangibles, terms of years in land, and the reversions
and remainders subject to such terms. Property held in trust, determinable and other qualified fees simple, life estates, as well as all legal
and equitable estates subject to executory interests, are unmarketable,
and may be said to be practically inalienable. I would, of course, place
no limit on the duration of fees simple absolute and terms of years.
But I would consider prohibiting the creation of a defeasible interest
or a trust estate which might continue to be such for longer than a fi..xed
period of time, determined as of the inception of the interest. The
period might be lives in being and twenty-one years, or if some other
of alienation. In New York and Michigan this result was reached without the aid of a
statute. On the other hand, in Minnesota and Wisconsin it was held that the power of
alienation was not suspended when a power to change the form of the trust res existed.
As to these cases and statutes, see 4 PROPERTY RI!STATBMBNT 2655 and 2734 (1944).
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period be thought more desirable, that could be the basis of the rule.
If an instrument provides for the objectionable kind of limitation,
neither the present interest nor the future interest following it would
necessarily be void. As to a determinable fee, fee simple subject to
a condition subsequent or to an executory interest, the fee simple
would become absolute, if and when the event named in the special
limitation, condition or executory limitation had not happened by the
end of the limiting period, say twenty-one years. As to trusts, they
would be terminated at the end of the period, if the provisions for their
termination had not already taken effect. Gifts over would have to be
rewritten in the light of the earlier termination of possessory interests.
Rules for this purpose could, no doubt, be developed. And in cases not
witpin the rules, a sort of cy pres doctrine for private trusts, such as has
already been referred to, could be employed.
I realize that to modify the provision for the termination of an
interest as stated in the terms of the creating instrument is bound to
cause difficulty. But the problem is much the same as that which has
been encountered for over a century in applying the English Thellusson Act:3 6 and its American counterparts. Moreover, legislation has
already been enacted in some states permitting possibilities of reverter
and rights of entry for a limited period of time, and invalidating provisions for a longer period of time, only as to the excess.37
Finally, legislative reform in this area of the law should proceed
only after thorough study and careful deliberation. There are times
when it is better to ''bear those ills we have than fly to others that we
know not of." The path of American legal history is strewed with
the remains of unsuccessful substitutes for the rule against perpetuities.
Let us not throw off the restraining yoke of the rule before an adequate
substitute is found.
36 39 and 40 Geo. III, c. 98 (1800). This was an act which restricted the duration
of accumulations. As to American counterparts of that act, see 4 PROPERTY R:esTATEMENT
c. 36 (1944).
37 As to such statutes, see SxMEs, HANDBOOK oP FUTURB lNrnREsTs 415 (1951);
Fla. Stat. Ann. (1952 Supp.) §689.18; Rhode Island Acts (1953), House Bill 838, amending General Laws of Rhode Island (1938), c. 435.

Addendum: After this article was in page proof, the writer was advised that a bill was
introduced into the Massachusetts legislature on December 3, 1953, the first section of
which is as follows:
"In applying the Rule against Perpetuities to an interest in real or personal property
limited to take effect after one or more valid life estates, facts existing at the termination
of such life estate or estates shall be considered in determining the validity of the interest."

